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DID CLINTON LIE?: DEFINING "SEXUAL RELATIONS"
PETER TIERSMA*
With the impeachment proceedings against President Clinton
now a distant memory, we can step back and consider the matter
somewhat more dispassionately than was possible in the midst of such
an intense and highly politicized debate. The focus of the impeach-
ment hearings was on whether Clinton perjured himself and engaged
in obstruction of justice when answering questions relating to the
nature of his relationship with a former White House intern, Monica
Lewinsky. I will limit my observations in this Article to the question
of whether Clinton committed perjury, and in particular, I will focus
on whether he lied when he denied having had a "sexual relationship"
with Lewinsky.
Yet the real subject of this Article is not the Clinton impeach-
ment, nor is it primarily about perjury law, although I will have things
to say about each. It is really about the difference between speech
and writing, and in particular about what happens when we write
something down in authoritative form, a process to which I refer as
textualization. Much of the ordinary practice of law consists of creat-
ing authoritative texts, such as statutes, contracts, and wills. In the
Clinton impeachment, the lawyers who questioned the president
about his relationship with Monica Lewinsky textualized the defini-
tion of the term "sexual relations" by presenting him with an authori-
tative written definition of the phrase. I will argue that doing so
allowed Clinton to pick apart the definition in a very unnatural way,
and helps explain why so many members of the public felt that he had
lied about his relationship with Lewinsky, even though technically he
may have indeed succeeded in avoiding making a false statement.
In addition, I will explore some of the issues of meaning that the
Clinton testimony raises. In particular, I will examine the nature of
definitions in a legal context. When Clinton was first asked during a
deposition in the Paula Jones lawsuit whether he had ever had a
* Professor of Law and Joseph Scott Fellow, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; author of
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"sexual affair" or "sexual relationship" with Lewinsky, he explicitly
denied it. During a second legal proceeding-his testimony before
Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr's grand jury-he was again
placed under oath and was asked about his deposition testimony.
Clinton insisted that his denials during the deposition were true based
on the ordinary meaning or definition of these terms. In other words,
he appealed to usage of terms like "sexual relations" in the speech
community.
Not all of Clinton's testimony at his deposition in the Jones law-
suit relied on the ordinary meaning of these words, however. The
lawyers for Paula Jones at one point provided him with a formal writ-
ten definition of the phrase "sexual relations." Jones's lawyers then
interrogated Clinton about whether, under that rather convoluted
written definition, he had engaged in "sexual relations" with Lewin-
sky. Clinton denied having done so.
During the subsequent grand jury proceedings, lawyers for Starr
once again interrogated Clinton about his denials of having engaged
in "sexual relations" with Lewinsky, as that term was defined in writ-
ing during the Jones deposition. His defense consisted of an ex-
tremely literalistic dissection of the words of the definition, much as a
tax lawyer might pick apart the language of the Internal Revenue
Code.
These events, which formed part of the basis for the Clinton im-
peachment proceedings, not only have intrinsic historical interest, but
are a fascinating illustration of how these different types of definition
operate, as well as the consequences of using one or the other in legal
proceedings. There are some important differences between defini-
tions that depend upon usage in the speech community and defini-
tions that are textualized, i.e., memorialized in authoritative written
form. A result of textualizing a definition is that it invites a very literal
interpretation. President Clinton was only too happy to accept this
invitation.
I. SPEECH, WRITING, AND AUTONOMOUS TEXT
Law is surely one of the most literate of all professions. Lawyers
and judges generate a tremendous output of written documents.
There is such a massive volume of statutes, cases, and other legal
texts, as well as hundreds of law reviews full of commentary on these
statutes and cases, that I sometimes feel completely overwhelmed by
this torrent of written material. And I'm sure that I'm not alone. It's
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well nigh impossible to read everything that's published, even in your
own specialty. Now that previously unpublished materials are avail-
able online, what was once a torrent has become a flood of Biblical
proportions.
Yet despite the huge volume of documents produced by the legal
profession, as well as the inclination of lawyers engaging in private
transactions to "get it in writing," the spoken word continues to play a
critical role in legal proceedings. Unlike trials in civil law countries,
which rely heavily on written submissions, police reports, and so
forth, American trials are still mostly oral. Jurors do little reading;
mainly, they listen and watch. Some judges will not even give them
copies of their jury instructions in writing. And even though the Stat-
ute of Frauds has for hundreds of years required certain sorts of
transactions to be written down, oral legal transactions remain com-
monplace. While statutes, deeds, and wills must almost inevitably be
in writing, most types of contracts need not be.' Other important legal
transactions, like getting married or taking the oath of citizenship,
and even taking the oath of the presidency, remain almost entirely
oral acts.
My basic thesis in this Article is that it makes a difference
whether we conduct legal affairs in speech or in writing. The nature of
the writing-whether it is merely a record of an oral event, or a de-
finitive statement that essentially replaces the oral event-also makes
a difference. The historical development of the law of wills in Eng-
land may help illuminate these distinctions, although parallel devel-
opments can be found in most areas of the law and in almost all legal
systems.
The making of an early English, or Anglo-Saxon, will was origi-
nally an entirely oral affair. It was essentially a declaration made
before a number of witnesses. The presence of the witnesses had vari-
ous functions, but it seems logical that their primary purpose was to
remember what had transpired. 2
The transition from speech to writing began when members of
the clergy started making written records of these wills. Because reli-
gious institutions were often beneficiaries of the testators, the clergy
naturally had an interest in recording those gifts. Still, writing at this
1. Peter M. Tiersma, Textualizing the Law, 8 FORENSIC LINGUISTICS 73 (2001).
2. See Peter M. Tiersma, From Speech to Writing: Textualization and Its Consequences, in
LANGUAGE AND THE LAW: PROCEEDINGS OF A CONFERENCE 349, 351-54 (Marlyn Robinson
ed., 2003).
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stage was clearly secondary. What mattered was what was said by the
testator, not what was written by a scribe. The written documents
were merely evidence of what had happened, rather than constituting
operative or dispositive legal documents in the modern sense.
3
Over the centuries, however, the writing and signing of the
document itself became the legally operative or dispositive act. As a
result of the Statute of Wills of 1540 and the Statute of Frauds in
1677, transfers of either real or personal property upon death had to
be in writing. A person's will was no longer a mental state that was
expressed in an oral act, but rather the words that were written on a
piece of paper or parchment. And those words were no longer just a
record created by a scribe, which might or might not be a faithful ren-
dition of what really happened, but were deemed to be the words of
the testator himself. As a result, anything that the testator might have
said at the time of executing his will is not part of his will. This is a
complete reversal from the earlier situation, where what the testator
said was the only thing that mattered, and the writing was an optional
record.
4
To summarize the historical development, there are generally
three major stages in the transition from oral legal act to authoritative
written text:
1. The legal act is completely oral, perhaps accompanied by some
ritual acts.
2. The legal act is still oral, but someone creates a written record of
what happened.
3. The legal act is contained in an authoritative written text; oral
evidence is largely irrelevant.
This historical development is characteristic not just of wills, but also
of statutes and other categories of legal documents.
Other legal transactions have not fully progressed through these
stages. The most interesting example may be contracts. An agreement
can be completely oral, just like a will in Anglo-Saxon England. It is
also possible to have an oral contract that is memorialized by a writ-
ten record that contains some or all of the terms. In contract law this
is generally called a memorandum. Like an oral Anglo-Saxon will
3. See Harold Dexter Hazeltine, Comments on the Writings Known as Anglo-Saxon Wills,
in ANGLO-SAXON WILLS vii (Dorothy Whitelock ed. & trans., 1930) (reprint 1986); see also
MICHAEL M. SHEEHAN, THE WILL IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 19 (1963) (describing the Anglo-
Saxon will as "an oral transaction in which gifts were made which were usually completed only
after the death of the donor.").
4. See Tiersma, supra note 2, at 354.
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whose terms are written down by a monk, such a contract is essen-
tially an oral agreement-the memorandum is simply a record or evi-
dence of the oral event. Under the Statute of Frauds certain types of
contracts (for example, those dealing with the sale of an interest in
land) are only enforceable if there is a memorandum of this kind.5 On
other occasions, the writing may be simply an optional aid to mem-
ory.
Finally, the parties to a contract might decide that they want to
create an authoritative text of their agreement. This, of course, is
what lawyers call an integrated agreement. An agreement may be
either partially or fully integrated, depending on the intent of the par-
ties. They might decide to write down certain terms of the deal and
intend those terms to be final, in which case the agreement would be
partially integrated. Other terms might not be written down, or might
be contained in documents that are not part of the integrated agree-
ment. The result of integration is that the text is viewed as the au-
thoritative statement of the parties' intentions. Because the
agreement is partially integrated, the text is final, but only as far as it
goes.
6
The parties might instead decide to reduce their entire agree-
ment to writing. If this is their intent, they have created a fully inte-
grated agreement. This means that any terms that are not included in
the writing, whether spoken or written, become legally irrelevant. In
deciding what terms are included in the contract between the parties,
you can only look at the text itself. The writing becomes the "exclu-
sive repository of their agreement."7 Thus, a fully integrated contract
is an authoritative text very much like a will or statute.
There are several consequences that flow from whether a legal
transaction is made orally, with or without a record, or by means of
an authoritative written text. Some of these differences are closely
tied to the speech/writing distinction. For example, we seldom re-
member the exact words that someone said. Instead, we tend to focus
on the meaning, or gist, of an utterance.8 This makes it very hard at a
later stage to concentrate on the exact words of an oral statement.
Once ideas are committed to writing, however, fixating on the words
5. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 391-444 (2d ed. 1990).
6. Id. at 470.
7. JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS 381 (3d ed. 1990).
8. See LAWRENCE M. SOLAN & PETER M. TIERSMA, SPEAKING OF CRIME: THE
LANGUAGE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (forthcoming).
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becomes possible. In addition, writing is much more permanent than
speech. Even if we could remember the exact words that someone
said a few days or weeks after they were spoken, it is highly unlikely
that we could continue to do so several years of decades after the
event. In addition, the relative permanence of writing makes it possi-
ble to read something again and again. Thus, with a writing we usually
have the very words of the author before us, sometimes many years
after the event, and we can take the time to study them.
There are also drawbacks to writing things down or, conversely,
advantages to speech. One is that with writing it is generally the case
that we have less information at our disposal to interpret what the
words mean. Speakers who are in face-to-face contact with one
another can use cues that are provided by a speaker's tone of voice,
facial expressions, gestures, and other paralinguistic information to
help determine what the speaker intended to communicate. Such
information is usually not available in writing. Also, people involved
in face-to-face interaction are more likely to share background infor-
mation that can help give meaning to their utterances. And if some-
thing is not clear, a person in face-to-face contact can ask what the
speaker meant.
The result is that someone who is trying to interpret a written
text typically has more, and more reliable, access to the exact words
of the author, but less information about the circumstances and back-
ground of the communication. It seems to me that this has profound
implications for how both speech and writing tend to be interpreted,
and why the reader of a written text is much more likely to focus on
the meaning of the exact words, while the hearer of speech will
concentrate more on the speaker's intended meaning. When we focus
on the words of a writing, the writer-and the writer's intended
meaning-fade into the background. With speech, on the other hand,
we tend to focus on the speaker, who is usually directly in front of us,
and on the meaning that the speaker intended to convey. The spoken
words tend to fade away.
The tendency of a reader to concentrate on the exact words of a
text is even more pronounced when the text is held to be authorita-
tive. By this I mean that the words of the text are deemed to be the
definitive expression of its author. Of course, most written documents
are not authoritative in this sense. And the notion of "authorship" in
the legal context is often a fiction; a testator who is deemed to
"speak" through the words of her will most likely did not write those
I Vol 79:927
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words, any more than a legislature that "speaks" through the statutes
that it enacts usually does not itself draft the statutory language.
Nonetheless, our legal system deems the words in texts like statutes,
wills, and integrated agreements to be the authoritative statement of
the person or body that executed or enacted them.
In addition, often an authoritative text is also deemed to be the
exclusive statement of its author's intentions. If so, what the testator
said during its execution is not part of a will, nor are statements by
legislators during debate part of the statute that is enacted. This is
related to the fact that authoritative texts tend to be written in a
highly autonomous style. 9 In an autonomous document, the writer
attempts to include in the text everything that the reader needs to
understand it. The writer does so because she may be separated from
the reader in time or space, and often in both. Information that might
be obvious in a face-to-face conversation may not be available when a
speaker or writer is separated from the hearer or reader in space or
time. Especially with a written text, the writer may have no idea who
the reader will be and therefore cannot assume that she shares back-
ground information or knowledge of the circumstances that prompted
the writing. Hence, whatever the writer wishes to communicate must
be in the text itself.
A simple illustration is that if I meet an acquaintance on the
street, I do not have to identify myself. I can just say "Hi." But if I call
the same person on the telephone, where we are separated by dis-
tance, I will generally have to speak more autonomously by saying,
"Hi, this is Peter Tiersma." Or consider an oral will in Anglo-Saxon
times, where a testator could simply refer to the land he owned at
Coventry. Everyone present would know what land he meant. In a
written will the land must be described with much greater particular-
ity. Information that is available just by looking at the speaker in a
face-to-face conversation needs to be expressed by words in a more
autonomous communication.
Although it is not an absolute correlation, writing tends to be
more autonomous than speech, simply because a written document is
more likely to be conveyed across space and time to a reader who
knows little about the writer and the circumstances of the writing. In
such a situation, the writer will strive to put as much information as
possible into the text itself and rely less on nonverbal information like
9. Paul Kay, Language Evolution and Speech Style, in SOCIOCULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF
LANGUAGE CHANGE 21 (Ben G. Blount & Mary Sanches eds., 1977).
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shared knowledge. It should be obvious that operative or dispositive
legal documents are usually highly autonomous. The drafter of such a
text tries to place as much information into the document as is neces-
sary for another lawyer or a judge, who is removed in space and time,
to understand what it means.
I have elsewhere discussed some ramifications of textualization
in the area of statutory interpretation. 0 In this Article I will explore
the consequences of textualizing a definition. This, of course, brings
us back to the question of the meaning of "sexual relations" in the
Affair Clinton. But before we proceed to that topic, we need to know
a few things about definitions.
II. DICTIONARIES AND DEFINITIONS
Anyone can define a word or phrase, and often enough we do so.
I might be conversing with someone and complain about problems
I've been having with my "router." My interlocutor might then ask
me, "What's a router?" I might then say something like: "Well, it's
this small box that sits on my desk and connects my computer to two
other computers in the house and lets all of them talk to each other
and share my DSL connection." I've provided a definition of the
word, albeit not a very elegant one, and it probably would not satisfy
someone who is more technically inclined. Of course, for me to define
a word in this way, I have to know what the word means. It's possible
that I know the meaning of the word because someone has previously
defined it for me. But it is far more likely that I was able to infer the
meaning from hearing other people use the word. As any linguist can
tell you, meaning ultimately derives from usage.
Of course, we live in a relatively literate society, and one of the
consequences of literacy is the development of dictionaries. Nowa-
days, many people who are confronted with an unknown word will
turn to a dictionary for a definition. This then raises the question:
where do dictionaries find the meaning of words? Logically enough, a
modern dictionary also focuses on usage. Linguists and lexicogra-
phers refer to definitions based on usage as descriptive. Such
10. For consequences of the notion of autonomy for statutory interpretation, see Peter M.
Tiersma, A Message in a Bottle: Text, Autonomy, and Statutory Interpretation, 76 TUL. L. REV.
431 (2001) [hereinafter Tiersma, A Message in a Bottlel.
[Vol 79:927
DID CLINTON LIE?
definitions try to describe the way that a word is actually used in a
particular speech community."
This emphasis on usage has not always been so fashionable.
Many of the earlier dictionaries and grammars of English paid more
attention to how people ought to use the language. Such definitions
are called prescriptive, in that they try to prescribe or dictate how a
word ought to be used, rather than describe how it is actually used. A
commonly-cited example of a prescriptive dictionary is that of Samuel
Johnson. Dr. Johnson proposed that "[b]arbarous or impure words
and expressions.., be branded with some note of infamy [and be]
eradicated whereever they are found."12 In actuality, Johnson was
rather inconsistent in his approach; he has also been credited as being
one of the first lexicographers to take notes on the actual usage of
writers. 13 Later dictionaries, most notably the Oxford English Dic-
tionary ("OED"), relied extensively on usage. The editors of the
OED managed to collect over five million citation slips that contained
actual examples of the use of specific words in context, along with
some details about the author and the work from which it was taken.14
The definitions in the OED, which has a strong historical slant, are
almost all supported by examples from actual usage.
Of course, whether a dictionary can ever be purely descriptive is
open to serious question. Despite the massive amount of usage upon
which the OED was based, it has been pointed out that it relied inor-
dinately on the works of Shakespeare. 15 Modern dictionaries may not
depend so heavily on one author, but they do tend to focus on "bet-
ter" writers or, at least, on published writing in sources like books and
newspapers. Thus, it is debatable whether any dictionary is entirely
descriptive, or whether it even can be. On the other side of the coin, it
is impossible for a dictionary's definitions to be truly prescriptive.
Usage is continually evolving, and a dictionary that completely
ignores the actual practices of the speech community is doomed to
obsolescence.
Even though the issue is largely settled among linguists and lexi-
cographers, many members of the public continue to think that a
11. See SIDNEY 1. LANDAU, DICIIONARIES: THE ART AND CRAFT OF LEXICOGRAPHY 32
(1989).
12. RONALD A. WELLS, DICTIONARIES AND THE AUTHORITARIAN TRADITION 88 (1973).
13. SIMON WINCHESTER, THE MEANING OF EVERYTHING: THE STORY OF THE OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 31 (20(13).
14. JOHN WILLINSKY, EMPIRE OF WORDS: THE REIGN OF THE OED 4 (1994).
15. Id.at57-91.
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dictionary should act as a guardian against what they perceive as de-
terioration of the language. The publication of Webster's Third New
International Dictionary 6 in 1961 set off a firestorm of criticism for its
alleged grammatical permissiveness. 7 No less of a figure than Justice
Scalia of the Supreme Court has endorsed common arguments that it
portrayed "common error as accepted usage."'" Scalia's point is strik-
ingly at odds with his reliance on dictionaries as keys to the meaning
of words. Surely a judge who wants to know what a word means
should be consulting a dictionary based on scientific lexicographic
principles, not one that pretends to have the power to dictate what is
"proper" English and what is not!
In any event, most modern dictionaries are primarily descriptive,
although they nonetheless almost always contain some evaluative
information on certain words. A good dictionary will tell you that the
word ain't is generally avoided in written language, but that it often
occurs in speech, where it is considered somewhat informal or sub-
standard usage. This usage information should be considered descrip-
tive, in that it merely describes how a word is ordinarily used. But
because people consult dictionaries not just to figure out what a word
actually means, but sometimes also for guidance on how a word ought
to be used, any such descriptive information can be put to prescriptive
use. Thus, there is probably no such thing as a purely descriptive or
prescriptive dictionary.
Despite these limitations on the dichotomy between descriptive
versus prescriptive dictionaries, the terminology is useful in exploring
what definitions aim to accomplish. In fact, the distinction is particu-
larly useful in law, because the law uses both types of definitions. The
vast majority of words in legal language are understood in their ordi-
nary, or descriptive, sense. Of course, lawyers use a great deal of
technical vocabulary, but for the most part such terms are also
defined by usage. In the case of ordinary legal dictionaries, the usage
that underlies the definitions derives from how the word or phrase is
used by members of a specific speech community: members of the
legal profession. Good legal dictionaries, like the more recent
editions of Black's Law Dictionary under the editorship of Bryan
16. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (Philip B. Gove ed., 1961).
17. WELLS, supra note 12, at 75-86.
18. MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 228 n.3 (1994).
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Garner, contain primarily descriptive definitions and are explicitly
based on actual usage of legal terminology by the profession. 19
But the law also makes widespread use of prescriptive defini-
tions, which some legal scholars call stipulative definitions.20 I have
elsewhere called them declaratory definitions, because the person
engaging in a legal act or transaction declares what the meaning of a
particular word or phrase will be for the purposes of that act or trans-
action. 21 With such a definition, actual usage is no longer relevant.
For example, a federal statute defines an employer as a "per-
son ... who has fifteen or more employees." Another statute defines
the term state, for purposes of that statute, to include Puerto Rico,
even though Puerto Rico is clearly not a state. Declaratory definitions
not only do not need to correspond to actual usage, but-as in the
examples above-may fly in the face of the ordinary meaning.
The reason that it is possible for a declaratory definition to devi-
ate from reality is that it is a fundamentally different type of speech
act from the average dictionary definition. Ordinarily, a (descriptive)
definition represents reality. In the words of John Searle, it must have
a "word-to-world" fit. It can be a correct or incorrect definition, de-
pending on how well it fits the world (i.e., is consistent with actual
usage).2 We can say that a definition is a good one because it fits the
world well.
On the other hand, a declaratory definition, like other declara-
tive speech acts, has a "world-to-word" fit. The world, in a sense,
must conform itself to the word. The truth, or correctness, of such a
definition is not relevant.23 As long as the speaker has the authority to
make it, the definition will govern over actual usage.
Of course, no person or group has the right to dictate how other
people should use a word (although some, like the Academie Fran-
aise, may claim such authority). What we do have is the authority to
define for others how we ourselves are going to use a word. So a
mathematician can declare, "let X equal 2.974" For the rest of that
conversation or lecture, X will indeed be 2.974. Likewise, a legislature
can declare that an "employer" is anyone who employs fifteen or
19. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (Bryan A. Garner ed., 7th ed. 1999).
20. For discussion, see FREDERICK BOWERS, LINGUISTIC ASPECTS OF LEGISLATIVE
EXPRESSION 161 (1989).
21. See PETER M. TIERSMA, LEGAL LANGUAGE 118-19 (1999).
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more employees. The legislature cannot change the ordinary meaning
of "employer." But it can establish the meaning of that word for pur-
poses of that specific legislation. The same was true when Paula
Jones's lawyers gave Clinton a written definition of the term "sexual
relations." They could not change the meaning of the term for ordi-
nary purposes. But for purpose of their subsequent questions during
this deposition, their definition-not the ordinary meaning-would
govern.
We will see that the distinction between these types of definitions
may be an important point in evaluating whether Clinton was telling
the truth during his deposition and in his testimony before Kenneth
Starr's grand jury. The reason is that on some occasions Clinton was
using the phrases "sexual relations" or "sexual relationship" in its
ordinary meaning, where it is defined by usage in the speech commu-
nity. On other occasions, however, he used the term "sexual rela-
tions" as that phrase was defined in writing. The written definition
textualized the meaning of the term and made the ordinary meaning
irrelevant.
Before returning to the Clinton impeachment, we need to deal
with one last preliminary matter. To understand whether Clinton
committed a potentially impeachable offense in his testimony regard-
ing sexual activity with Lewinsky, we must make a short digression
into certain aspects of the law of perjury. The reason is that, in the
final analysis, the legal issue is not whether Clinton lied, but whether
he committed the crime of perjury.
III. THE LAW OF PERJURY
In and of itself, lying is not a crime. To commit perjury, a person
must have taken an oath to testify truthfully. Federal law also re-
quires that the person "willfully and contrary to such oath state[] or
subscribe[] any material matter which he does not believe to be
true. '24 This is often called the false statement requirement. 5 Not only
must the accused have made a false statement, but it must have been
material, and the accused must have known that the statement was
not true.
24. 18 U.S.C. § 1621(1) (2000).
25. Peter Meijes Ticrsna, The Language of Perjury: "Literal Truth," Ambiguity, and the
False Statement Requirement, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 373 (1990).
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Because of the oath requirement, it is primarily statements that
Clinton made during his deposition in the Paula Jones case, as well as
testimony that he later gave before the grand jury, that could consti-
tute perjury. In addition, he responded to a number of interrogatories
under oath.
There was some discussion during the impeachment proceedings
regarding whether Clinton's statements about his relationship with
Monica Lewinsky were material to Paula Jones's lawsuit against him
for sexual harassment. After all, there is no doubt that his relation-
ship with Lewinsky was completely consensual; there were never any
allegations that it constituted harassment. So its relevance to the
Jones lawsuit is debatable.
We are going to leave that issue aside, however, in order to con-
centrate on whether Clinton made a false statement under oath.
One final but important preliminary matter is that the United
States Supreme Court has set a relatively high standard for determin-
ing whether a statement is false for purposes of perjury law. The
seminal case is Bronston v. United States. The issue in Bronston was
"whether a witness may be convicted of perjury for an answer, under
oath, that is literally true but not responsive to the question asked and
arguably misleading by negative implication."26
The case arose because Mr. Bronston was involved in bankruptcy
proceedings. Attorneys for his creditors were examining him, under
oath, regarding assets that he personally owned in various countries,
as well as assets owned by companies under his control. During this
examination, the following exchange occurred:
Q. Do you have any bank accounts in Swiss banks, Mr. Bronston?
A. No, sir.
Q. Have youever?
A. The company had an account there for about six months, in
Zurich. 27
The "truth" was that Bronston had had a large personal bank account
in Switzerland for five years. Bronston was convicted of perjury, and
his conviction was affirmed on appeal. But the Supreme Court
reversed. The Court acknowledged that in ordinary conversation,
Bronston's response would probably be understood to imply that he
had never had a personal bank account in Switzerland. But this was a
26. 409 U.S. 352, 352-53 (1973).
27. Id. at 354.
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legal proceeding where the parties were represented by lawyers
trained in adversarial proceedings. Chief Justice Burger emphasized
that the perjury statute refers to what the witness "states," not to
what he "implies."28 If a witness equivocates or gives a vague re-
sponse, it is the examining lawyer's responsibility to probe more
deeply and to clarify the answer.
The Bronston case is therefore understood as having established
a literal truth defense to the charge of perjury. Clinton was educated
in the law and was also a law professor for a while. There is every
reason to believe that he would have been aware of Bronston's literal
truth defense, if not before the Paula Jones deposition, then certainly
before he appeared to give his grand jury testimony.29
Thus, when Paula Jones's lawyers asked him during his deposi-
tion whether he had ever been alone in the Oval Office with Monica
Lewinsky, Clinton was careful not to make an outright denial. Rather,
he responded that he remembered one or two times during a
government shutdown when Lewinsky came to drop off some papers
for him in the Oval Office. This statement was apparently true, as far
as it went: Lewinsky did come by the Oval Office during the govern-
ment shutdown, and seems to have brought along some papers, per-
haps merely for the sake of appearances. But what Clinton does not
mention is that she apparently did some more interesting things than
just dropping off some boring government documents. Moreover,
they seem to have been alone in the Oval Office more like ten to
fifteen times.
Thus, what Clinton does not say is much more significant than
what he says. But, according to Bronston, the only thing that seems to
matter is what he actually states. As long as what a witness states is
true, he cannot be convicted of perjury. What he does not state, as
well as any implications that might be drawn from his silence, are
legally irrelevant. This line of questioning is quite interesting, and I
discuss the issue in some detail in a forthcoming book co-authored
28. Id. at 357-58.
29. During his grand jury testimony, Clinton mentioned several times that it was not his
duty to "volunteer" information and that his statements about Lewinsky were true, even though
they might have been "misleading." In addition, his lawyers referred extensively to the Bronston
case and the literal truth defense in a Memorandum they filed with the Office of Independent
Counsel. Preliminary Memorandum Concerning Referral of Office of Independent Counsel, in
THE STARR REPORT: THE FINDINGS OF INDEPENDENT COUNSEL KENNETH W. STARR ON
PRESIDENT CLINTON AND THE LEWINSKY AFFAIR 355,4034)6 (Wash. Post ed. 1998) [hereinaf-
ter THE STARR REPORT].
I Vol 79:927
DID CLINTON LIE?
with Lawrence Solan.30 For now, I would like to move on to the defi-
nition of "sexual relations."
IV. "SEXUAL RELATIONS": THE ORDINARY MEANING OF THE
TERM
On a number of occasions, Clinton was asked about whether he
had had sexual relations, or words to that effect, with women other
than his wife, and without the critical phrase being explicitly defined.
For instance, Clinton was sent a set of interrogatories by the Jones
lawyers, one of which asked him to list the names of each and every
federal employee with whom he had had sexual relations while presi-
dent. He answered, "none. '31
Some other examples dealing specifically with Monica Lewinsky
occurred during his deposition in the Paula Jones case. Here, lawyers
for Jones began by using a somewhat different term, "sexual affair":
Q. Did you have an extramarital sexual affair with Monica
Lewinsky?
A. No.
Q. If she told someone that she had a sexual affair with you be-
ginning in November of 1995, would that be a lie?
A. It's certainly not the truth. It would not be the truth.32
Toward the end of the deposition the subject arose again when
Clinton's lawyer, Robert Bennett, asked the president-his own cli-
ent-several questions. Some of these questions related to an affida-
vit that had been submitted by Lewinsky:
Q: In paragraph eight of her affidavit, she says this: "I have never
had a sexual relationship with the President, nor did he propose
that we have a sexual relationship, he did not offer me employment
or other benefits in exchange for a sexual relationship, he did not
deny me employment or other benefits for rejecting a sexual rela-
tionship."
Is that a true and accurate statement as far as you know?
A: That is absolutely true. 33
30. SOLAN & TIERSMA, supra note 8.
31. Jones v. Clinton, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1122 (E.D. Ark. 1999). The court noted that there
was no definition of "sexual relations" in the interrogatories. Id. at n.6.
32. Id. at 1129. referring to the Clinton deposition in the Paul Jones sexual harassment
case, at 78 [hereinafter Clinton Depositionj. The text of Clinton's deposition is available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/pjones/docs/clintondep031398.htm.
33. Id. at 1122 (citing Clinton deposition at 204).
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Clinton would later admit under oath, during his grand jury
testimony, that he and Lewinsky were physically intimate. At the be-
ginning of his grand jury testimony he read a prepared statement in
which he admitted that he was alone with Lewinsky on several occa-
sions during 1996 and early 1997. He regretted that he had "engaged
in conduct that was wrong" and "inappropriate intimate contact," but
he insisted that the encounters "did not consist of sexual inter-
course."
34
When Kenneth Starr's lawyers pressed him on the details, Clin-
ton usually fell back on this prepared statement. Essentially, however,
Clinton admitted during his grand jury testimony that Lewinsky had
engaged in acts of oral sex on him. So, did he commit perjury when he
previously stated-under oath-that he had not had a "sexual affair"
with Lewinsky and that the statement in her affidavit denying a "sex-
ual relationship" was "absolutely true"?
Not surprisingly, Kenneth Starr's lawyers, convinced that Clin-
ton's denials were false, homed in on this point during Clinton's grand
jury testimony. 35 They specifically asked him about his testimony that
Lewinsky's affidavit was "absolutely true." Although they made
statements in interrogatory form, they were essentially accusing him
of lying. Clinton responded to their implicit accusations as follows:
I believe at the time that she filled out this affidavit, if she
believed that the definition of sexual relationship was two people
having intercourse, then this is accurate. And I believe that is the
definition that most ordinary Americans would give it.
If you said Jane and Harry have a sexual relationship, and
you're not talking about people being drawn into a lawsuit and
being given definitions, and then a great effort to trick them in
some way, but you are just talking about people in ordinary
conversations, I'll bet the grand jurors, if they were talking about
two people they know, and said they have a sexual relationship,
they meant they were sleeping together; they meant they were
having intercourse together.
So, I'm not at all sure that this affidavit is not true and was not
true in Ms. Lewinsky's mind at the time she swore it out.
36
Clinton is explicitly invoking the ordinary definition of the term
"sexual relationship." To be more exact, his answer to the question
34. THE STARR REPORT: THE EVIDENCE 354 (Phil Kuntz ed., 1998).
35. Starr's lawyers never specifically asked Clinton about his denial, during his deposition,
that he had a "sexual affair" with her, but it is clear that Clinton's answer would pertain to this
exchange as well.
36. THE STARR REPORT: THE EVIDENCE, supra note 34, at 359.
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about the Lewinsky affidavit assumes that Lewinsky was using the
term in its ordinary definition. Clinton also makes it clear that the
ordinary definition depends upon usage in the speech community. His
claim, of course, refers to a descriptive rather than prescriptive defini-
tion. And because it involves a descriptive claim, it should be possi-
ble-at least, in theory-to determine whether it corresponds to
actual usage. While I am not aware of a definitive study that has been
done on the matter, there is some preliminary evidence that English
speakers are quite split on this issue.
Some evidence of the uncertainties inherent in this phrase comes
from a study by two researchers, Stephanie Sanders and June
Reinisch, who surveyed around 600 undergraduate college students to
determine their usage of the phrase to "have sex" with someone."
The researchers asked their subjects whether it would be accurate to
say they "had sex" with someone under a number of different condi-
tions.3" One of the conditions was that the person had engaged in
"deep kissing (French or tongue kissing)" with someone else.39 Only
2% of the respondents would say that they "had sex" under those
circumstances.4O If the condition was that the other person "had oral
(mouth) contact with your genitals," slightly over forty percent of the
subjects would say that they "had sex" with that person.41 Nor surpris-
ingly, in the case of penile/vaginal intercourse, virtually all the
respondents (99.5%) would say they "had sex" with their partner. 2
The study, conducted before the impeachment proceedings in
the Senate, did not specifically ask about the term "sexual relation-
ship." And it is unclear to what extent the results of research on
undergraduates can be generalized to the population as a whole. In
fact, the study, which appeared in the Journal of the American Medi-
cal Association, was heavily criticized for these and other reasons,43
37. Stephanie A. Sanders & June Machover Reinisch. Would You Say You "Had Sex"
If...?, 281 JAMA 275 (1999). Printing the study during the Clinton impeachment proceedings
was criticized as politicizing the American Medical Association, which published the journal.





43. See Letters: Attitudes Toward and Definitions of Having Sex, 282 JAMA 1916-19
(1999). One of the letters reports a different study that reached very similar results to those
found by Sanders and Reinisch. Id. at 1917.
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and the editor of the journal was later forced to resign . 4 Nonetheless,
the study's overall conclusion seems correct: there is widespread
disagreement about whether terms like "have sex" or "sexual rela-
tionship" include sexual activities other than intercourse.
No less of an authority than Webster's Dictionary defines "sex-
ual relations" by referring to "coitus." It then defines "coitus" as
"physical union of male and female genitalia accompanied by rhyth-
mic movements leading to ejaculation of semen from the penis into
the female reproductive tract.
45
My point is not that Clinton was right in arguing that the ordi-
nary meaning of phrases like "sexual relations" refers mainly or only
to intercourse. One can debate the reliability of research results and
whether dictionary definitions truly reflect usage, in the sense that
they may or may not accurately describe actual speech and writing.
Instead, my point is simply that speakers of English are sharply
divided on what type of sexual acts are included within these phrases.
Clinton was surely a wily witness who intended to mislead his interro-
gators. But it is harder to conclude that he made a false statement in
response to questions that contained such a vague term.
One explanation for the fiercely divergent public opinions about
whether Clinton lied in his deposition may therefore simply be that
speakers differ in how they define this critical phrase. But an addi-
tional factor is that the term "sexual relationship" is a particularly
slippery one. To be more exact, it is a term that shows prototype
effects, a concept whose implications for the law is something that
Larry Solan and Steven Winter have explored.4 6 Basically, this
44. Terence Monmaney, AMA Fires Editor Over Publishing Sex Survey Media: Officials
Say That Printing A Study On College Students' Attitudes Toward Oral Sex During Impeachment
Trial Wrongly Places Medical Association In Political Debate, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1999, at A16.
45. WEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
UNABRIDGED (Philip Babcock Gove ed., 1986).
Not surprisingly, the President's lawyers perused an array of dictionaries and found
several other examples of "sexual relations" being defined as intercourse. Trial Memorandum
of President William Jefferson Clinton, January 13, 1999, at 88 (noting that Random House
Webster's College Dictionary (1st ed. 1996) at 1229, defines "sexual relations" as "sexual inter-
course; coitus;" Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (10th ed. 1997) at 1074, defines "sex-
ual relations" as "coitus;" Black's Law Dictionary (Abridged 6th ed. 1991) at 560, defines
"intercourse" as "sexual relations;" and Random House Compact Unabridged Dictionary (2d
ed. 1996) at 1755, defines "sexual relations" as "sexual intercourse; coitus").
46. See, e.g., Lawrence Solan, Law, Language, and Lenity, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 57
(1998); Lawrence M. Solan, Judicial Decisions and Linguistic Analysis: Is There a Linguist in the
Court?, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1069 (1995); Lawrence M. Solan, Learning Our Limits: The Decline
of Textualism in Statutory Cases, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 235; Steven L. Winter, A CLEARING IN THE
FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND MIND (2001).
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phenomenon involves the fact that for many categories there are cer-
tain members of that category that are considered "prototypical"
examples. People tend to view robins as better examples of the
category "bird" than they do penguins, for example.47 Thus, a robin is
a prototypical bird, while a penguin is less of one. Likewise, the
prototypical "car" or "automobile" is probably for most people a
sedan. A station wagon would be less prototypical, although most
speakers would probably call it a car as well. On the other hand, a
sport utility vehicle is a more peripheral member of the category for
many speakers, and a pickup even more so. There are, in fact, plenty
of speakers who would not regard either one as a "car."
In the Clinton case, speakers of English would almost universally
agree that intercourse is a member of the category of "sexual rela-
tionships." In fact, intercourse is no doubt the prototypical example
of a sexual relationship. That is to say, when someone says that two
people had engaged in "sexual relationship," most of us would call to
mind an image of a couple engaging in intercourse. That is the central
or core meaning of the phrase.
Of course, English speakers would also include other types of
sexual acts within the meaning of the phrase. Yet as the survey of
college students suggests, speakers seem to differ substantially on
whether and to what degree other types of acts that involve the sexual
organs or sexual gratification should fall within the ordinary defini-
tion of the term. It appears that most sexual acts falling short of inter-
course are more marginal members of the category. Some people
include such acts within the meaning of the phrase, while others
would not, and still others might not be sure either way.
In the face of this uncertainty, it seems to me that persuading
twelve jurors to agree that Clinton made a false statement when he
denied having a "sexual affair" with Lewinsky, or when he stated that
Lewinsky's affidavit was true, would have been difficult. On neither
of those occasions was the crucial phrase, either "sexual affair" or
"sexual relationship," defined, nor was there any effort to ascertain
how Clinton understood the phrases. If prosecutors wish to convict
someone of perjury, they should only be able to do so when the testi-
mony contains terminology that is more specific and less susceptible
to these prototype effects. At the least, they should prosecute some-
one for perjury only when that person's statement is false under the
47. See Eleanor Rosch, Cognitive Reference Points, 7 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 532 (1975).
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core meaning of the relevant term. After all, the prosecution had to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Clinton made a false state-
ment, and that he knew it was false. Because Clinton used the ordi-
nary meaning of the rather vague term "sexual relations," it seems to
me that the Starr team failed to make its case that he perjured himself
in these exchanges.
The Bronston case places a great deal of confidence in the ability
of examining lawyers to identify vague, incomplete, or misleading
answers to their questions and to probe more deeply when confronted
by such answers. In this case, the Jones lawyers should have been
aware that a term like "sexual relationship" can be highly malleable
and should therefore have explored how Clinton defined it, or how
Clinton believed that Lewinsky defined it. Oddly enough, they never
did so. Instead of trying to find out how Clinton understood the
phrase, or how he thought that Lewinsky or the ordinary speaker of
English would understand it, they proceeded instead by providing
Clinton with an authoritative written definition of the term. In doing
so, they unwittingly waded into a very different definitional quagmire.
V. TEXTUALIZING THE DEFINITION
The lawyers working for Paula Jones were not naive. They must
have known that Clinton was a clever man who would try to slip
through their fingers. But in trying to pin Clinton down, they made
what-at least, in retrospect-would turn out to be a serious tactical
error. As mentioned, they should have asked Clinton what sorts of
activities he understood the phrases like "sexual relations" or "oral
sex" to include, and then they should have followed up by asking him
whether he and Lewinsky had engaged in activity that fit within his
definition. Instead, they did what legislators often do when they draft
statutes: they defined the term "sexual relations" in writing and then
asked him if his conduct with Lewinsky fit within their definition.
Perhaps if they had formulated a better definition, the strategy would
have worked. But the definition that they drafted was highly convo-
luted, turned some relatively innocuous acts into "sexual relations,"
and at the same time left at least one enormous loophole.
The original definition had three subparts. Judge Wright, who
was presiding at the deposition, ruled that only the first subpart
applied, leaving the definition as follows:
For the purposes of this definition, a person engages in "sexual
relations" when the person knowingly engages in or causes...
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[1] contact with the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh,
or buttocks of any person with an intent to arouse or gratify the
sexual desire of any person....
"Contact" means intentional touching, either directly or
through clothing. 8
This is obviously a prescriptive definition, or what I have called a
declaratory definition. It is not intended to describe actual usage.
Rather, it declares what the meaning of the phrase is to be for a
particular purpose, in this case, for purposes of the deposition.
One of the interesting things about a declaratory or prescriptive
definition like this one is that it supersedes the ordinary meaning of
the term. Like a mathematician who defines the meaning of X in a
proof, Jones's lawyers have defined what this phrase will mean in any
subsequent questions. This definition is now the authoritative state-
ment of the meaning of "sexual relations" for any question using that
phrase during the rest of the deposition. Not only is it authoritative,
but its authors clearly intended it to be the exclusive definition of the
phrase. The definition, in other words has been textualized.
Recall that a testator is deemed to have placed all his testamen-
tary intentions into the written will, just as legislators endeavor to
place all their intentions into the text of a statute. What the testator
says during the execution is not part of the will, just as comments and
debates by legislators are not part of a statute. At most, what testators
and legislators say can be used to interpret the writing. Their oral
statements cannot add to it. Thus, the effect of textualizing a defini-
tion is that it becomes the authoritative and exclusive statement of the
meaning of the defined term. The actual usage of the speech commu-
nity no longer matters.
The definition is also quite autonomous, in the sense that it was
written to be able to stand on its own, which is once again like a stat-
ute. It is highly abstract and impersonal. To understand what the
definition means, you therefore focus mainly on the words them-
selves.
Because it is an authoritative statement that prescribes meaning
rather than describing it, a declaratory definition can be either
broader or narrower than ordinary usage. I suspect that most speak-
ers of English would not think that the mere act of touching some-
one's inner thigh or even a woman's breast through her clothing, with
an intent to arouse either that person or the actor, would be engaging
48. Jones v. Clinton, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1121 n.5 (E.D. Ark. t999).
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in sexual relations. According to the Sanders and Reinisch survey,
only 3 percent of respondents would consider such actions to fit
within the meaning of "having sex." But, odd as it seems, the Jones
definition specifies that those acts constitute "sexual relations." This
substantially broadens the reach of this term beyond its ordinary
meaning.
A declaratory definition can also narrow the ordinary meaning.
An illustration of narrowing is the statute referred to earlier in which
"employer" is defined as anyone who employs more than fifteen peo-
ple. As we will see, it turns out that the definition of "sexual rela-
tions" narrowed the ordinary meaning of the word in ways that the
Jones lawyers seem not to have anticipated.
Definitions are intended to make the law more determinate by
circumscribing the exact parameters of a word's meaning. Often they
succeed, at least to some extent. But the success does not come
cheaply: by trying to fix the boundaries of a word or phrase as exactly
as possible, and thus trying to restrict the options of those subject to a
rule or regulation, you create an incentive for them to interpret it in a
hyperliteral way in a search for loopholes. The more tightly you
weave the net in an effort to prevent a recalcitrant object of regula-
tion from escaping, the more desperately that person will look for a
way out. The best example of this is probably the Internal Revenue
Code, which in an attempt to specify the tax rules as exactly as possi-
ble has spawned a huge volume of statutes, regulations, and rulings,
all of which motivate creative taxpayers and their lawyers to find
loopholes, which lead to further regulations to plug the loopholes,
and renewed efforts to find new loopholes.
Like a lawyer scrutinizing the tax code, Clinton read the definition in
a very literalistic way and found the loophole he was searching for.
This allowed him to state during his deposition, when being ques-
tioned by a lawyer for Jones, that he had never engaged in "sexual
relations" with Lewinsky under the definition:
Q .... And so the record is completely clear, have you ever had
sexual relations with Monica Lewinsky, as that term is defined in
Deposition Exhibit 1, as modified by the Court? ...
A. I have never had sexual relations with Monica Lewinsky. ... 49
Later, during the grand jury proceedings, Clinton was interro-
gated by Starr's lawyers, who clearly thought that his denial should be
49. Id. at 1192 (citing Clinton Deposition at 78).
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considered perjury. He explained that the definition referred to the
person in question engaging in contact with one of the enumerated
body parts of the other:
I thought the definition included any activity by the person being
deposed, where the person was the actor and came in contact with
those parts of the bodies with the purpose or intent or [sic] gratifi-
cation, and excluded any other activity) 0
Because Lewinsky engaged in oral sex on him, rather than vice
versa, Clinton argued that she had engaged in contact with one of his
relevant body parts, which would mean that under the definition she
had had sexual relations with him. But he argued that he had never
engaged in contact with one of her listed body parts for the purpose
of sexually gratifying either him or her, so that under the definition he
had not engaged in "sexual relations" with her.
Unlike the lawyers in the Jones case, who never explored in any
detail what Clinton thought was the ordinary meaning of the phrase
"sexual relationship," lawyers working for the Office of Independent
Council now probed how Clinton understood the textualized defini-
tion:
Q. Well, I have a question regarding your definition then. And my
question is, is oral sex performed on you within that definition as
you understood it, the definition in the Jones-
A. As I understood it, it was not, no ....
Q. If the person being deposed kissed the breast of another
person, would that be in the definition of sexual relations as you
understood it when you were under oath in the Jones case?
A. Yes, that would constitute contact. I think that would. If it
were direct contact, I believe it would. I-maybe I should read it
again, just to make sure.
Because this basically says if there was any direct contact with an
intent to arouse or gratify, if that was the intent of the contact, then
that would fall within the definition. That's correct.
Q. So, touching, in your view then and now-the person being
deposed touching or kissing the breast of another person would fall
within the definition?
A. That's correct, sir.51
It would therefore seem that as Clinton understood the definition, for
a man to kiss a woman's breast for the purpose of sexual gratification
would constitute "sexual relations," while allowing a woman to orally
50. THE STARR REPORT: THE EVIDENCE, supra note 34, at 356.
51. Id. at 387.
20(41
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
stimulate his private parts would not. To be more exact, in that situa-
tion the woman would be engaging in sexual relations, while the man
would not be.
Many people found Clinton's distinction absurd. Judge Richard
Posner, for example, wrote that "[f]or the passive participant in a
sexual act not to be engaged in sexual relations would imply that
when Lewinsky was fellating the President she was engaged in sexual
relations but he was not. 5 2 Based in part on the counterintuitive logic
of this proposition, Posner concluded Clinton must have lied.5
3 Like-
wise, the Starr report criticized Clinton for his unreasonable "linguis-
tic parsing.
'54
The grand jury was similarly unimpressed, as indicated by a ques-
tion they conveyed through the lawyer who was conducting the
examination:
Q. Well, the grand jury would like to know, Mr. President, why it
is that you think that oral sex performed on you does not fall within
the definition of sexual relations as used in your deposition.
In answering, Clinton makes it evident that he had studied the
words of definition and interpreted it as authoritative text. Signifi-
cantly, he no longer refers to the ordinary meaning of the phrase:
A. Because that is-if the deponent is the person who has oral sex
performed on him, then the contact is with-not with anything on
that list, but with the lips of another person. It seems to be self-
evident that that's what it is. And I thought it was curious.
Let me remind you, sir, I read this carefully. And I thought about it.
I thought about what "contact" meant. I thought about what
"intent to arouse or gratify" meant.
And I had to admit under this definition that I'd actually had sexual
relations with Gennifer Flowers. Now, I would rather have taken a
whipping than done that, after all the trouble I'd been through with
Gennifer Flowers ... 55
Of course, it is very odd to suggest that one person can have sex-
ual relations with another, while the converse is not true. As the say-
ing goes, "it takes two to tango." Yet to a large extent, Clinton's
hyperliteral analysis is a natural result of textualizing the definition.
In contrast to speech, which is usually spontaneous, an autonomous
written text tends to be carefully planned out in advance. As a conse-
52. RICHARD A. POSNER, AN AFFAIR OF STATE: THE INVESTIGATION, IMPEACHMENT,
AND TRIAL OF PRESIDENT CLINTON 47 (1999).
53. Id.
54. THE STARR REPORT, supra note 29, at 169.
55. THE STARR REPORT: THE EVIDENCE, supra note 34, at 409.
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quence, lawyers who interpret such texts usually assume that every
word has meaning and that the choice of one word over another must
be significant. Moreover, because the definition is in writing, the
reader can study it carefully and read it over and over again.
Clinton testified that he read the definition carefully and thought
about what the words meant. He obviously focused closely on the
exact words of the definition, which refers to a person "engaging in"
contact with the specified body parts of the other person. As Clinton
observed during the grand jury testimony, "I thought the definition
included any activity by the person being deposed, where the person
was the actor and came in contact with those parts of the bodies with
the purpose or intent or gratification [sic], and excluded any other
activity." This is not a crazy interpretation of that phrase. If I hit you,
I have obviously engaged in contact with you. But it is less clear that
we would say that you "engaged" in contact with me. Perhaps you
were "involved" in contact with me, but to "engage" in contact
strongly suggests that the subject of the verb is an intentional actor
who causes the contact to occur, nor just a passive recipient. And in a
written authoritative text, the choice of one word over another possi-
ble word is generally held to be significant.
Notice also that "contact" is specifically defined as "intentional
touching." This reinforces the notion that the definition envisions an
actor who is initiating and engaging in the contacting, and a passive
recipient of the touching or contact. Clinton is correct in asserting
that the definition, literally construed, applies only to the actor. Of
course, whether it is factually true that Clinton was merely a passive
recipient of Lewinsky's favors is another matter entirely. It is con-
ceivable, especially when sexual activity is forced upon someone, that
the person is nothing more than a recipient of sexual contact. But in a
consensual situation like that between Clinton and Lewinsky, it seems
unlikely.
In his response to the grand jury's question, Clinton also made
what might be called a "backup" argument. Assuming arguendo that
the more passive partner in an oral sexual encounter is held to have
"engaged in" intentional contact with the more active partner, he
suggests that it would still be true that the passive partner might only
have engaged in contact with the other person's lips, not necessarily
with one of the body parts on the list.
We begin to see that Clinton is parsing this textualized definition
in much the same way that a judge would construe a statute. A list
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like the one in this definition need not be exhaustive. It might simply
be an enumeration of some examples. One of the better known can-
ons of construction, known as expressio unius est exclusio alterius,
addresses exactly this issue. The expression of one or more members
of a category is deemed to exclude other members of that same cate-
gory. 6 It essentially means that a list is deemed to be complete, rather
than illustrative or exemplary. For this reason, it is most appropriately
applied to highly textualized and autonomous documents, which are
generally held to be the complete and exclusive statements of their
makers.5
7
Some textualists, like Justice Scalia, have argued that expressio
unius and the other canons of construction should be applied more
broadly, and that there should be less emphasis on the intent of the
drafter.58 For now, at least, Clinton is clearly in the camp of the textu-
alists, even though his political positions have little in common with
those of Scalia. What mattered is the plain meaning of the words,
even if that meaning is at odds with what the drafters (presumably
Paula Jones's lawyers) would have intended, and even if it seems at
odds with common sense.
Whether Clinton "engaged" in contact with the listed body parts
was not the only issue. The definition also contained a second verb,
which states that sexual relations occur when a person "causes" con-
tact with the body parts in question. Causation, of course, is a notori-
ously slippery concept. Dean William Prosser wrote that "[t]here is
perhaps nothing in the entire field of law which has called forth more
disagreement, or upon which the opinions are in such a welter of con-
fusion.S
9
Clinton took the position that he understood "cause" in the defi-
nition to require the use of physical force, or at least some kind of
coercion. Clinton is certainly right that if he forced Lewinsky to touch
his body parts, whether by physical force, threats, or duress, we could
properly say that he "caused" her to engage in contact with him. On
the other hand, if he passively allowed such contact, we would be less
56. See TIERSMA, LEGAL LANGUAGE, supra note 21, at 83-84.
57. Tiersma, A Message in a Bottle, supra note 10, at 431.
58. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 25-27 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).




likely to reach this conclusion. Between these two extremes the ques-
tion becomes more difficult.
What seems like the most likely scenario is that he encouraged
her to engage in contact with his body, or that he invited her to do so,
or that he signaled in some way that he welcomed it.60 But does en-
couraging or inviting someone to do something "cause" the person to
do the act? This depends on how significant a factor the encourage-
ment or invitation was in bringing about the result. It is conceivable
that Lewinsky's enthusiasm about engaging in sexual activity was
what caused her to engage in contact with Clinton's body, even if
technically his encouragement or invitation was also a but-for cause.
Clinton did not rely on the vagueness that inheres in causation,
however. He explained during the grand jury testimony that the
origin of the definition was also a factor:
Q. What did you understand the word "causes," in the first
phrase? That is, "For the purposes of this deposition, a person
engaged in 'sexual relations,' when the person knowingly" causes
contact?
A. I don't know what that means. It doesn't make any sense to me
in this context, because-I think what I thought there was since this
was some sort of-as I, remember, they said in the previous discus-
sion-and I'm only remembering now, so if I make a mistake you
can correct me. As I remember from the previous discussion, this
was some kind of definition that had something to do with sexual
harassment. So, that implies it's forcing to me, and I-and there
was never any issue of forcing in the case involving, well, any of
these questions they were asking me.
They made it clear in this discussion I just reviewed that what they
were referring to was intentional sexual conduct, not some sort of
forcible abusive behavior. 61
Remarkably, Clinton, who up to this point had taken a strong
textualist position, suddenly becomes an intentionalist. He specifically
invokes the drafting history of the definition. He is referring to a dis-
cussion during his deposition in the Jones case, when Jones's lawyers
first offered their written definition. Jones's lawyers told Judge
Wright that they had largely taken the definition from a federal rule
of evidence relating to sexual harassment.2 While construing "cause"
as "force" or "compel" would seem out of place in a deposition in-
quiring into consensual sexual activity, it would be entirely in keeping
60. For examples, see THE STARR REPORT supra note 29, at 16142.
61. "HE STARR REPORT: THE EVIDENCE, supra note 34, at 356-57.
62. Clinton Deposition, supra note 32, at 19. The reference is to FED. R. EVID. 413.
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with the origins and purpose of the rule from which the language was
borrowed. Clinton therefore essentially claimed that the "legislative
history" of the definition confirmed his interpretation of its language.
This approach to interpretation is very common among contem-
porary judges. It begins with the text, but-unlike textualism-does
not stop there. Rather, judges employing this approach will confirm
their initial understanding of the text by considering available infor-
mation on a statute's legislative history, even if the statute is not
necessarily ambiguous. At the same time, many such judges are reluc-
tant to base an interpretation on legislative history if it would over-
ride the most obvious meaning of the text.
Clinton's conversion to intentionalism does not stop here. He
becomes even more of an intentionalist when he invokes what is es-
sentially the "rejected proposal" rule, which is sometimes used by
courts to infer the intent of the legislature. As described by William
Eskridge, this rule posits that "proposals rejected by Congress are an
indication that the statute cannot be interpreted to resemble the re-
jected proposals."6 3
In his testimony before the grand jury, Clinton invoked the "re-
jected proposal" principle when he was asked about another type of
sexual activity. One of Starr's lawyers, Sol Wisenberg, asked Clinton
whether inserting a cigar into a woman's private parts would come
within the definition, as he claimed to understand it. There is little
doubt that inserting a cigar into a woman's sexual organs for the pur-
pose of gratification comes literally within the scope of the first para-
graph: the person in question would have engaged in intentional
contact with one of the enumerated body parts for the purposes of
sexual gratification of either one of the parties involved. Perhaps
Clinton might have argued that touching someone with a cigar is not
within the definition of "contact," which requires "intentional con-
tact, directly or through clothing." But it is hard to avoid the conclu-
sion that someone who touches someone else's body with a cigar has,
at the very least, caused contact with the other person's body. The
person manipulating the cigar cannot plausibly argue that he was but
a passive recipient of someone else's amorous advances.
So, how could Clinton talk his way out of this problem? If the
Starr Report is to be believed, the President had engaged in precisely
63. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67, 69
(1988). For examples, see id. at 67 n.3.
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this action with Lewinsky during the late afternoon of Sunday, March
31, 1996, in a hallway outside the Oval Office study. 4 This is precisely
what Starr's lawyers were eager to find out:
Q. As you understood the definition then, and as you understood
it now, would [the definition] include sticking an object into the
genitalia of another person in order to arouse or gratify the sexual
desire of any person? Would it constitute, in other words, contact
with the genitalia'?
A. I don't know the answer to that. I suppose you could argue
that since section 2, paragraph (2) was eliminated, and paragraph
(2) actually dealt with the object issue, that perhaps whoever wrote
this didn't intend for paragraph (1) to cover an object, and basically
meant direct contact.
So, if I were asked-I've not been asked this question before. But I
guess that's the way I would read it.
Q. If it-that it would not be covered? That activity would not be
covered?
A. That's right. If the activity you just mentioned would be cov-
ered in number (2), and number (2) were stricken, I think you can
infer logically that paragraph (1) was not intended to cover it. But,
as I said, I've not been asked this before. I'm just doing the best I
can.
Recall that when Clinton was being deposed in the Jones lawsuit,
one of the first things that the Jones lawyers did was to hand him the
definition of "sexual relations," which initially had three subparts.
After some legal wrangling by the lawyers, Judge Wright narrowed
the definition to only the first of the three numbered paragraphs.
Clinton testified that he circled part one to remind him that it was the
only one that applied.6 5 Significantly, the second paragraph, which
was not part of the definition used at the deposition, stated that a
person engages in sexual relations when a person engages in or causes
"contact between any part of the person's body or an object and the
genitals or anus of another person. '6
Clinton is certainly correct that this paragraph seems to have
been drafted explicitly to cover scenarios like that involving a cigar.
Whether Judge Wright's rejection of this part of the definition is as
significant as he claims is less certain. Eskridge has pointed out that
the Supreme Court has not always used rejected proposal arguments
when they were available, suggesting that while they are sometimes
64. THE STARR REPORT, supra note 29, at 162.
65. THE STARR REPORT: THE EVIDENCE, supra note 34, at 356.
66. Id. at 420.
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helpful indicators of legislative intent, they should be used with
caution.67 This is true also in the Clinton case. It seems doubtful that
Judge Wright, in excluding paragraph 2, meant to eliminate sexual
contact that occurred by means of an object from the ambit of "sexual
relations." She might just as well have thought that the second para-
graph was duplicative of the first. So I am not entirely persuaded by
his argument, although I have to admit that I am impressed by it.
The lesson is that creating a textualized prescriptive definition
can be useful in pinning down the exact meaning of a word, or "fenc-
ing in" the meaning, especially when a word has a fairly broad seman-
tic range in ordinary usage. But this exactness comes at a cost. Those
who interpret such language will try to find holes in the fence. And
very often, like Clinton, they succeed.
I certainly do not want to suggest that it is moral or ethical to
dissect a definition in the way that Clinton did, especially when you
have a legal obligation to provide information and to speak the truth.
But it is certainly the case that declaratory definitions, especially
those that are highly textualized, tend to allow and perhaps even
promote a hyperliteral interpretation and a search for loopholes.
Clinton was a willing participant in this game. But it was Jones's law-
yers who made it possible.
CONCLUSION
So, did Clinton lie? To be more exact, did he commit perjury?
And could the case have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt?
My personal view is that he probably did not commit perjury
based on the evidence we have so far examined. He certainly in-
tended to mislead his questioners in the Jones deposition. But the
Bronston case emphasized that intent to mislead is not the legal stan-
dard in deciding whether someone made a false statement under fed-
eral perjury law. It is up to the examining lawyer to establish a clear
record of the witness's testimony. This is something that the Jones
lawyers failed to do. Instead of probing how Clinton understood
phrases like "sexual relationship," they handed him their own defini-
tion. This textualized prescriptive definition provided Clinton with an
opportunity to search for loopholes, and at least in my mind, he found
them. And when he was asked questions that did not invoke the writ-
ten definition, the terms that were used, like "sexual relationship" or
67. Eskridge, supra note 63, at 69.
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"sexual affair," were simply too uncertain at the margins to support a
perjury conviction.
But that is not the end of the matter. This discussion has so far
presupposed that Clinton's version of what happened is true. Accord-
ing to the Starr Report, Monica Lewinsky told a different story. She
agreed that they had never had sexual intercourse. But in her account
to Starr, Lewinsky claimed that Clinton did, in fact, engage in inten-
tional contact with some of her body parts which were listed in the
definition." So, at least with respect to whether Clinton engaged in
sexual relations, and whether the President perjured himself in deny-
ing it, the question ultimately boils down to a classic "he said/she
said" swearing contest.
It's possible that Starr's lawyers, who had the benefit of greater
resources and access to much more information than the lawyers who
represented Paula Jones, could have pinned Clinton down during the
grand jury proceedings. Yet here Clinton pulled out his own piece of
authoritative text: his written statement that he and Lewinsky had
engaged in "conduct that was wrong" and "inappropriate intimate
conduct," but that this conduct did not include sexual intercourse.
Throughout the questioning before the grand jury, he held this state-
ment out as the definitive and complete statement of what had
happened. Every time Starr's lawyers asked him to be more specific,
he referred back to the statement. Clinton, in other words, treated
this statement as being fully textualized, just like a completely inte-
grated contract. Oral evidence that could expand upon or modify the
statement was, according to Clinton, inadmissible.
Many people might fault Clinton for relying on a text that he had
written and then refusing to answer questions about it. Ordinary folks
would surely be entitled to wonder about why Clinton could get away
with this. One answer is that he was the president. Moreover, his rela-
tionship with Lewinsky was never all that relevant to the allegations
by Paula Jones regarding sexual harassment. In addition, it is worth
pointing out that the legal system itself routinely relies on written
texts and then refuses to answer questions about what the text means.
Consider the Supreme Court case of Weeks v. Angelone.69 During the
penalty phase of a capital proceeding, a Virginia judge read to the
jury a convoluted instruction that spelled out how they were to decide
68. THE STARR REPORT, supra note 29, at 159-63.
69. 528 U.S. 225 (2000).
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whether convicted cop-killer Lonnie Weeks should live or die.70 Dur-
ing deliberations, the jury sent the judge a question that indicated
they were confused on how to weigh the mitigating evidence, a point
on which the instruction was remarkably obscure.71 Like Clinton, the
judge refused to answer the question, referring them back to the ob-
scure instruction he had originally given them. The Supreme Court
held that the judge's response was perfectly proper.
7 3
Language is powerful. Written text, especially authoritative text,
can in some ways be even more powerful. It can pin people down. But
it also offers people opportunities to slip away. A textualist approach
encourages people to try to slip through loopholes in the text. An
intentionalist approach encourages people to evade the text and focus
more on evidence of the intended meaning of the speaker. Clinton, of
course, used both approaches.
As a result, we may never know exactly what happened between
Clinton and Lewinsky. In my opinion, it doesn't really matter. But it
does provide an instructive opportunity to explore the nature of defi-
nitions, and of legal text more broadly.
70. Id. at 228.
71. Id. at 229; see also Peter Tiersma, The Rock), Road to Legal Reform: Improving the
Language of Jury Instructions, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1081, 1096-99 (2001).
72. Weeks, 528 U.S. at 229. For other examples, see Peter M. Tiersma, Jury Questions: An
Update to Kalven and Zeisel, 39 CRIM. L. BULL. 10 (2003).
73. Weeks, 528 U.S. at 234.
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